Rights of Indemnity as They Affect Liability Insurance by Conley, Scott & Sayre, George
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 6
1-1961




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Scott Conley and George Sayre, Rights of Indemnity as They Affect Liability Insurance, 13 Hastings L.J. 214 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol13/iss2/6
Rights of Indemnity
As They Affect Liability Insurance
By Sco-rr CoNLEy-* and GEORGE SAYBEt
LIABILITY INSURANCE policies insure their holders against loss
arising from injury to the property or person of another for which the
holder is legally responsible. As liability is ultimately shifted between
individuals by law, so is the liability shifted between their respective
insurance carriers. Nowhere is this principle more evident than in the
field of liability insurance pertaining to indemnity.
One indemnity situation exists when A secures a judgment against
both B and C, but B is permitted to recover the entire amount for
which he is held liable from C. Another indemnity situation exists
where A sues only B and recovers against him, but because of the rela-
tionship between B and a third party, C, B may recover in full from C.
Phrased in terms of the respective liability insurance carriers, then, and
assuming the existence of an indemnity situation, B's liability insurer
as subrogee of B's rights may recover the entire amount of its liability
from C's carrier.
Rights of indemnity may be created by express agreement between
the parties,' or may arise as a matter of law.2 Express indemnity agree-
ments have long been given effect in California.3 However, indemnity
arising as a matter of law has only recently been generally recognized
in this state.4 The discussion herein will pertain primarily to those
rights of indemnity arising as a matter of law between two defendants
or their insurers, but mention is made of several recent decisions per-
taining to the interpretation of written contracts of indemnity. Rights
of indemnity arising by way of warranty are outside the scope of this
article.
* Yale University, Yale University Law School; Partner, Sedgwick Detert Moran
& Arnold; Author, numerous articles on insurance.
- Pomona College, Stanford University Law School; Associate, Sedgwick Detert
Moran & Arnold.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772.
2 Paossma, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
826 CAL. JuR. 2d Indemnity §§ 1-40 (1956).
4 See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162
Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958).
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Indemnity Arising as a Matter of Law
Indemnity arising as a matter of law developed as an exception to
the rule of noncontribution between joint tortfeasors.5 That rule was
deemed especially harsh in the case of certain jbint tortfeasor de-
fendants who were held liable almost without fault, while their co-
tortfeasors, who were actually the responsible parties, escaped liability
through the operation of the rule. To alleviate this injustice, -some
jurisdictions now allow the technical joint tortfeasor to recover his
entire loss from the responsible party on the theory that a right of
indemnity exists as a matter of law in favor of the technical tortfeasor
as against the other.6
Situations exemplifying the allowing of indemnity actions include
that in which an initial carrier has been held liable to the shipper for
loss of the goods shipped but is permitted indemnity against the con-
necting carrier whose negligence actually caused the loss, 7 or in which
a carrier thus held liable can recover from one whose negligence pro-
duced the defective condition in the carrier's equipment which caused
the injury to the goods.8 Another instance is that in which an employer
held for an injury to an employee on the theory of violation of the non-
delegable common law duty to furnish a safe place to work can have
indemnity from one whose negligence rendered the working condi-
tions unsafe."
Perhaps the most common cases of all those coming under this head
are the ones in which a muncipal corporation is held liable to a person
injured by defects in the highway, sidewalk or other product of munic-
ipal activity for public use, and is then allowed to secure reimbursement
from the parties who created the defect.'0 Almost identical with the
municipal corporation cases are those in which an occupier of a prem-
ises is held liable for injuries arising from dangerous conditions thereon,
but can recover from the one who unknown to him created the dan-
gerous condition;'- and those in which the owner of the leased premises
5 See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
130, 147 (1933).
6 Pnossaa, supra note 2.
7Produce Trading Co. v. Norfolk So. R.R., 178 N.C. 175, 100 S.E. 316 (1919);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Eastin & Knox, 100 Tex. 556, 102 S.W. 105 (1907).
8 Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. v. J. Gutradt Co., 10 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1926).
9 Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W.
614 (1925).
10 Fort Scott v. Pennsylvania Lubric Oil Co., 122 Kan. 369, 252 Pac. 268 (1927);
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Allegheny County, 57 Md. 201 (1881). See also 4
DmLoN, M NIcPAL Corp. 3032 (5th ed. 1911).
11 Westfield Gas & Mill. Co. v. Noblesville & E. Gravel Rd. Co., 13 Ind. App. 481,
41 N.E. 955 (1895); Ga. Power Co. v. Banning Cotton Mills, 42 Ga. App. 671, 157
S.E. 525 (1931).
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is held to the same liability, but can recover over from the lessee in
possession. 12 Again, an employer held liable under the theory of re-
spondeat superior for the torts of his agent or servant can get indemnity
from the latter.13
Various Theories of Indemnity
Unfortunately, no general rules have evolved which adequately
govern the general application of the indemnity principle. 14 It has been
stated that indemnity is permitted only where the indemnitor has
breached a duty of his own to the indemnitee; 15 that it is permitted
only where there is a great difference in the gravity of the fault of the
two tortfeasors; 16 or that it is permitted only where the right to indem-
nity rests upon a disproportionate difference in the character of the
duties owed by the two co-tortfeasors to the injured plaintiff.1 7 In other
terms indemnity has been characterized as arising in favor of one tort-
feasor against another when the former's liability is merely "secondary,"
or imposed by law, rather than "primary";' 8 it has been characterized
as arising where one joint tortfeasor's negligence is merely "passive"
while the co-tortfeasor's negligence is "active"; 19 and it has been char-
acterized as arising in some situations where there is an "implied con-
tractual relationship" between the two co-tortfeasors. 20
The most widely used of the above analyses employed by the courts
in indemnity situations seem to be those based on "active v. passive"
and "primary v. secondary" negligence. These analyses do not seem to
be satisfactory, however, as under them the courts have been faced
with the difficult task of drawing a line between that negligence which
is "passive" or "secondary" enough to support indemnity against the
"active" or "primary" tortfeasor, and that negligence which is not. The
more recent implied contractual analysis of indemnity appears to be
somewhat more satisfactory.
12 Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31
N.E. 987 (1892); Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 Pac. 118 (1926).
12 Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); Georgia, So. & Fla. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Ga.
271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898).
14 PROSSER, supra note 2, at 251.
I, Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
16 Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951).
17 Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA
L. Ri-v. 517 (1952).
Is Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W.
614 (1925).
19 Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13
(1926).
20 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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The Ryan Case
In 1956, the United States Supreme Court considered the problem
of indemnity in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship
Corp.,21 and concluded that indemnity may arise from an implied con-
tract between the co-tortfeasors. In that case, a longshoreman em-
ployed by the Ryan Stevedoring Company, was severely injured when
a large roll of pulpboard became dislodged and struck him violently
while on board ship. The rolls, stowed by the Ryan Stevedoring Com-
pany, had been improperly secured. The shipowner's officers supervised
the loading of the entire ship and had the authority to reject unsafe
stowage.
The injured longshoreman received compensation and medical pay-
ments from the stevedoring company's compensation carrier. Later
he elected to bring suit against the steamship corporation, which he
claimed was liable under the law of negligence for the injury which
he had received. The shipowner then filed a third party complaint
against the stevedoring company in indemnity.
The injured longshoreman's case against the shipowner resulted in
a verdict in the longshoreman's favor in the amount of 75,000 dollars.
By stipulation the shipowner's third party complaint was submitted
to the judge who had presided over the longshoreman's case. The dis-
trict judge dismissed the third party complaint. The court of appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the verdict in favor of the longshoreman
but reversed the dismissal of the third party complaint and directed
that judgment be entered for the shipowner.
In this posture the case came to the Supreme Court. The question
in the case pertaining to indemnity was whether in the absence of an
express agreement of indemnity the stevedoring company was obli-
gated to reimburse the shipowner for damages caused by the steve-
doring company's improper performance of the service of loading the
ship. The Supreme Court held that the stevedoring company was so
obligated on the basis of implied contract; the stevedoring contractor
in holding himself out as an expert in loading ships and in accepting a
job in that capacity had impliedly contracted to the shipowners that
the loading would be done in a safe and proper manner. The steve-
doing company had breached this implied agreement, and the ship-
owner's action was for damages for breach of the implied contract
measured by the foreseeable damages occasioned by the breach,
namely the damages incurred by the injury to the longshoreman.
The Ryan case, and later Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 22 both expressly indicated that "In the area of con-
211d.
22 Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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tractual indemnity an application of the theories of 'active' or 'passive'
as well as 'primary' or 'secondary' negligence is inappropriate." 23
California Decisions
With few exceptions, California did not seem to recognize rights
of indemnity arising by operation of law under any theory until 1957
or 1958.24 In 1957 the California legislature modified the common law
to provide for contribution between joint tortfeasors, effective as of
January 1, 1958.25 This statute, though creating a statutory right of
contribution, purported not to impair existing rights of indemnity. The
existence of a right of indemnity was expressly recognized in subdivi-
sion (f) of that section which provides: "This title shall not impair any
right of indemnity under existing law and where one tortfeasor judg-
ment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another there shall be no
right of contribution between them."
The first case to expressly recognize the existence of rights of in-
demnity in causes of action accruing prior to or under the statute was
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance
Co. 2 6 This case grew out of an injury to an employee of the California
Building Maintenance Company sustained while he was engaged in
washing the windows of a school building pursuant to a contract be-
tween the school district and the Building Maintenance Company. The
maintenance company through its workman's compensation insurer
paid compensation. The injured employee brought a "third party
action" against the school district for having failed to supply a safe
place within which to work. The employee obtained judgment against
the school district and collected in full. Next, the school district
brought an action against the maintenance company to recover the
amount paid by the school district to the employee pursuant to the
judgment rendered, alleging breach of contract on the part of the
maintenance company in failing to furnish the worker certain safety
equipment which it had expressly agreed to supply, the absence of
which allegedly caused the injury. The Building Maintenance Com-
23 Id. at 569.
24 See Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1960). However, prior to 1957 California did recognize indemnity rights as existing
between parties in the following situations: (1) Between a principal and a negligent
servant, Johnson v. City of San Fernando, 35 Cal. App. 2d 244, 95 P.2d 147 (1939);
(2) between an automobile owner and a negligent bailee-driver, Baugh v. Rogers, 24
Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944); and (3) between a freight forwarder and a negligent
consignee, Merchant Shipper's Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594,
170 P.2d 923 (1946).
25 CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 875.
26 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958).
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pany answered that the suit was an attempt to impose liability on the
maintenance company for injury sustained by its own employee on
which the maintenance company's insurer had already paid compen-
sation. Further, it was argued that such indirect liability would be in
conflict with provisions of the California Workman's Compensation Act
which grants an exclusive remedy to an employee against his employer
for injuries in the course of and arising out of employment. At the trial
level motion for nonsuit was granted. The school district appealed.
The court held it was improper to grant a nonsuit and reversed the
judgment, stating that "whether the school district should be precluded
from recovery by reason of its conduct [that is, whether the conduct
of the district helped bring on the damage] is at. least a question of
fact and should have been left to the jury."27
In the opinion there is language which would suggest that the de-
cision might have been the same even in the absence of an express
contract to supply the unfurnished safety equipment. "Even if this did
not amount to an express agreement to indemnify the school district
for damages caused to it by a breach of the contract by the mainte-
nance company, such a warranty or agreement to indemnify would
necessarily be implied."28 Thus, though the opinion refers in many
places to the "active-passive, primary-secondary" character of the neg-
ligence in indemnity, the holding in the case seems to be based pri-
marily upon the implied contract indemnity theory developed in the
Ryan case.2 9
2 7 Id. at 449, 328 P.2d at 794.
28 Ibid.
29 It is here appropriate to mention the legislative change which has taken place
with respect to "third party" actions since the San Francisco School District case. This
case and the Ryan case both involved injury to a contractor's employee who, notwith-
standing the fact that he was covered by his employer's workmen's compensation insur-
ance, nevertheless successfully brought suit against the property owner or "third party"
for common law damages. In both cases the third party then secured indemnity against
the injured employee's employer. The effect of this rather circular legal procedure was
to make the employee's own employer liable not only for the injured employee's work-
men's compensation but for additional damages awarded to him in common law as well.
The California legislature felt that this double burden placed upon the employer was in
contravention of the exclusive remedy theory of the workmen's compensation statutes.
Thus in 1959 the legislature passed section 3864 of the Labor Code which reads as follows:
Liability to Reimburse or Hold Third Person Harmless on Judgment or
Settlement. If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the em-
ployee, the employer, or both jointly against a third person results in judgment
against such third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall
have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judg-
ment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior
to the injury.
This statute abolished the right of indemnity by the third person against the injured em-
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Soon after the School District case, the California Supreme Court
permitted a plaintiff city to maintain an indenmity action against an
abutting landowner who had altered a portion of the public sidewalk
for his own benefita ° Here a pedestrian walking upon the altered
sidewalk was injured and collected damages from the city by way of
judgment. The court held that while both the city and the owner were
joint tortfeasors, and each was directly liable to the pedestrian, the city
was entitled to be indemnified because of the special relationship exist-
ing between the two co-defendants with respect to the use of the side-
walk. The court stated that the rule against noncontribution between
co-tortfeasors "admits of some exceptions and the right of indemnity
may arise as a result of contract or equitable consideration."31 [Em-
phasis added.] The court stressed the "primary" responsibility of the
owner who created or permitted the condition and the "secondary"
duty of the city to correct the condition of which it had notice. Thus
it would seem that this case is not based upon the implied contract rule
as is the Ryan case, but is rather based upon the "primary-secondary"
analysis employed previously in other jurisdictions.
The Ryan case theory was again the basis of indemnity, however,
in DeLaForest v. Yandle.3 2 This was an action in indemnity arising
out of the repair of a truck axle by Temple, a welder, and Yandle, a
machinist. One Mast owned a truck which required axle repairs. Mast
engaged DeLaForest, the operator of a repair shop, to make the repairs.
DeLaForest sublet the work to Temple and Yandle, who held them-
selves out as qualified in their professions. The work was negligently
done, and as a result the truck driven by Mast collided with an auto-
mobile driven by one Urban causing the latter's death. Both DeLaFor-
est and Mast had put the axle in the truck without inspecting it. The
Urban heirs sued Mast and DeLaForest, who were held liable. DeLa-
Forest and Mast then demanded indemnity from Temple and Yandle
on the theory that the latter had breached an implied contractual
obligation to properly repair the axle. The court permitted Mast and
DeLaForest to recover.
In 1960 the California indemnity decisions were summarized in
Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy.3 3 The case arose on the following facts:
the Alisal Sanitary District had contracted with Kennedy to the effect
ployee's employer on the theory of implied contract. In order to recover in indemnity
the third party must now rely on an express contract of indemnity between himself and
the injured employee's employer.
3o City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
S1 Id. at 130, 330 P.2d at 803.
32 171 Cal. App. 2d 59, 340 P.2d 52 (1959).
33 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1960).
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that the latter would install manholes in an outfall line which ran from
Alisal's sewage processing plant into the Salinas River. Kennedy con-
structed the manholes but failed to place lock covers on them or to
construct them so that the top of each manhole was substantially above
the outfall line. In December, 1955, the river, swollen by rains, backed
up the outfall line and forced sewage out of the manholes. The sewage
ruined a crop of celery in an adjoining field owned by one Ambrosini.
Ambrosini brought an action against the sanitary district and recovered
judgment against the sanitary district. The district then brought suit
in indemnity against Kennedy to recover the amount of the Ambrosini
judgment plus attorney's fees incurred in the defense of that action.
Kennedy's counsel demurred to the complaint as failing to state a
cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave
to amend. On appeal the trial court's decision was reversed, and the
demurrer to the complaint overruled. The court based its decision upon
the Ryan doctrine which gives rise to indemnity where there is a
breach of an implied contract to perform a job in a safe and non-
negligent manner: 4
The gist of the complaint is the defendant's breach of its obligation to
perform the engineering work in a skillful, expert and careful manner
they bad represented they were capable of doing and the plaintiff's
reliance on the defendant's judgment and knowledge in matters in
which the latter were experts. Such an obligation carries with it an
implied agreement to indemnify and to discharge foreseeable dam-
ages resulting to the plaintiff from the defendant's negligent perform-
ance.
The court noted that, in the final analysis, the determination of
whether or not a given factual situation would give rise to indemnity
is for the jury to decide.35
The nature and scope of the relationships between the plaintiff and
the defendants; the obligations owing by one to the other; the extent
of the participation of the plaintiff in the affirmative acts of negli-
gence; the physical connection of the plaintiff, if any, with the defend-
ants acts of negligence by knowledge or acquiescence; or the failure
of the plaintiff to perform some duty it may have undertaken by virtue
of its agreement-all are questions of fact that should be left to the jury.
Effect of the California Decisions
From the aforementioned cases three generalizations may be drawn:
1. California courts are tending more and more to imply a contrac-
tual duty running from one co-defendant to another in the employer-
34 Id. at 79,4 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
35 ibid.
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independent contractor situation in which the potential indemnitor has
promised to perform a given service or act for the potential indemnitee
and has in the process injured another party. The basis for this trend
is undoubtedly Ryan, which has been quoted and approved in some
of the California decisions. Further, under the language of Alisal, it
may be that a right of indemnity under the implied contract theory
exists as a matter of law in all cases where there is an employer-
independent contractor relationship, but that the employer's right of
indemnity may be defeated if it can be shown that the employer is too
closely associated with the circumstances causing the injury to be per-
mitted recovery.
2. There may be a few other special situations which will support
the right of indemnity as a matter of law, where, because of purely
equitable considerations, the court feels indemnity is proper. The only
California case in this area to date seems to be the Ho Sing case.
3. In the employer-independent contractor cases the courts empha-
size several criteria which are important in measuring the employer's
conduct for the purpose of determining whether or not his right of
indemnity should be given effect. The cases suggest at least four criteria.
a. The degree of control exercised by the employer over the
actions of the independent contractor.
b. The relative expertise of the employer as opposed to that
of the independent contractor in performing the particular job at hand.
c. The relative reliance by the employer on the skill of the in-
dependent contractor in the performance of the job.
d. The relative expense which the employer would have to in-
cur in closely supervising an activity of the independent contractor so
as to prevent injury.
Indemnity Contracts in California
The recent developments in indemnity have not been confined only
to indemnity as it arises by operation of law. Three important cases
have come down during the past two years delineating the effect to be
given to written contracts of indemnity. In County of Alameda v.
Southern Pac. R.R ., 3S6 it was held that no action could be maintained
on the theory of implied contract where a written indemnification
agreement between the parties was executed providing for indemnifi-
cation in some circumstances but failing to provide for indemnity under
the circumstances of the case. The other two cases, Vinnell Co. v. Pacific
Elec. Ry. 37 and Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buehler,38 dealt with the
31 55 Cal. 2d -- , 360 P.2d 327, 11 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1961).
37 52 Cal. 2d 411, 340 P.2d 604 (1959).
38 54 Cal. 2d 445, 353 P.2d 924, 6 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1960).
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issue of whether or not certain contracts of indemnity covered the
would-be indemnitee for injury resulting from his own negligence.
In the County of Alameda case, supra, a truck belonging to one Cali
was damaged when it went out of control while crossing an improperly
maintained railroad grade crossing. Cali brought an action for damages
to the truck against the County of Alameda, the Southern Pacific Rail-
road, and the Rock Company which used the tracks under agreement
with Southern Pacific. Cali recovered judgment against the County
and the railroad, but the Rock Company was awarded a nonsuit. The
county paid one-half the judgment, and the railroad paid the other
half. The county then sued Southern Pacific and Rock in indemnity
for the one-half the county paid to Call. Southern Pacific sued Rock
in indemnity for the one-half that Southern Pacific paid. The county
was awarded recovery in indemnity against both Southern Pacific and
Rock on the basis of City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, but
the court denied Southern Pacific recovery.
Southern Pacific's action against Rock was based upon contract.
The Southern Pacific had a sidetrack agreement with Rock which pro-
vided that Rock would hold Southern Pacific harmless and would in-
demnify Southern Pacific for all liability resulting directly or indirectly
from the operation by Rock of any of its equipment or locomotives
over the track. Southern Pacific argued:
1. That this provision would provide indemnity under the circum-
stances of the case; and
2. That even if this provision was not adequate to support indem-
nity, indemnity should be implied under the implied promise
theory of indemnity as in DeLaForest v. Yandle, supra, and
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Mainte-
nance Co., supra. Rock argued that the contract provision was
insufficient to support indemnity in this particular case, and sec-
ondly, that no implied promise of indemnity could be inferred
in this instance as the construction of the SP-Rock contract as a
whole would negative such a promise. The court accepted Rock's
arguments and refused to allow Southern Pacific indemnity.
In Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry., supra, the court held that an in-
demnitee cannot recover against a non-negligent indemnitor for injury
to the indemnitee's property or employee unless the contract of indem-
nity specifically provides that the indemnitee will be indemnified for his
own negligence. In that case a flood control district had contracted
with the Vinnell Company to build a storm drain under Pacific Elec-
tric's tracks. Pacific Electric took up some tracks to facilitate construc-
tion, and the Vinnell Company proceeded to excavate the area. An
Nov., 1961] RIGHTS OF INDEMNITY
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employee of the Pacific Electric Company negligently switched a train
onto a track which ran into the excavated area injuring a Pacific Elec-
tric employee and damaging the train.
Before construction began Pacific Electric had granted an easement
to the flood control district and the Vinnell Company, which included
the following indemnity agreement: 39
Contractor hereby releases and agrees to indemnify and save Railroad
harmless from and against any and all injuries to and deaths of per-
sons, claims, demands, costs, loss, damage, and liability howsoever
same may be caused resulting directly or indirectly from the per-
formance of any or all work to be done upon the property and be-
neath the tracks of railroad and upon the premises adjacent thereto
under said agreement between District and Contractor, also from all
injuries to and deaths of persons ... howsoever same may be caused
either directly or indirectly, made or suffered by said contractor, con-
tractor's agents . . . while engaged in the performances of said work.
The Vinnell Company sued Pacific Electric for damage to the ex-
cavation and their material therein. Pacific Electric cross-complained
for property damage and the bodily injury to their employee. The trial
court held for Vinnell Company. On appeal the decision was affirmed,
the appellate court stating "In the overwhelming majority of cases the
result reached by the court's interpretational efforts can be condensed
into the simple rule that where the parties failed to refer expressly to
negligence in their contracts, such failure evidences the parties' inten-
tion not to provide for indemnity for the indemnitee's negligent acts.."40
The opposite result was reached in Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel &
Buehler, supra, in which the court held that a general hold harmless
agreement between the third party and the injured employee's contrac-
tor was sufficient to support indemnity, even though the third party had
breached a duty to the employee. In that case an employee of the
defendant Hatzel fell down an elevator shaft while engaged in con-
structing a building belonging to Harvey. The injured employee sued
the Harvey Machine Company, whereupon the Harvey Machine Com-
pany brought the declaratory relief action against Hatzel & Buehler to
determine the parties' respective rights on the indemnification agree-
ment executed between the two companies. The indemnification agree-
ment read as follows:41
[Defendants agree] ... to indemnify and hold harmless Harvey Ma-
chine Company and its officers and employees against liability includ-
ing all costs and expenses for bodily or personal injuries including
39 52 Cal. 2d at 414, 340 P.2d at 606.
40 Id. at 415, 340 P.2d at 607.
41 54 Cal. 2d at 447, 353 P.2d at 926, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
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death at any time resulting therefrom sustained by any person or
persons including employees of... [defendants] and arising from the
use of the premises, facilities or services of Harvey Machine Co., Inc.,
its officers or employees.
The trial court allowed indemnity in favor of Harvey, and the ap-
pellate court affirmed, holding that the accident was in the scope of
the indemnity agreement. The court differentiated the Harvey situa-
tion from the Vinnell situation in the following particulars:
1. The owner was not conducting any independent operations on
his premises during contractor's work in the Harvey case as he was in
the Vinnell case.
2. In Harvey the injury did not result from some conduct or omis-
sion unrelated to the contractor's performance over which the indem-
nitee exercised exclusive control.
3. In Harvey the breach of duty on the owner's part was merely
passive negligence, while in the Vinnell case the Pacific Electric em-
ployee was actively negligent.
The court concluded, "The accident, in these circumstances, was
one of the risks, if not the most obvious risk, against which Harvey
sought to be covered."42 Thus under the court's analysis it seems that a
party may recover in indemnity for his own negligence under written
contract if the contract is interpreted as providing for indemnification
for the negligence of the indemnitee. However, the language of the
case does indicate that such recovery may be allowed only when the
negligence of the indemnitee is merely "passive" rather than "active."
In using the "active-passive" approach to the situation in the Harvey
case the court may well be opening up the area of contract interpreta-
tion to many of the same problems which faced courts which had con-
sidered the indemnity problem prior to the Ryan decision.
Problems Arising Under California Decisions
The development of the law of indemnity in California over the
last few years has raised several problems with respect to insurance
cases. The first major problem is a practical one concerning joinder of
causes of action. Other problems concern the interpretation of various
provisions in liability policies in connection with claims for indemnity.
Lastly, there is a problem as to the effect of the doctrine of res judicata
in indemnity action.
Joinder of Causes of Action
As previously stated, a right to indemnity may exist between two
joint tortfeasors who are both before the court in the main action, or
may arise in the situation where only one tortfeasor is being sued by
42 Id. at 448, 353 P.2d at 927, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
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the plaintiff, but where that tortfeasor has a right over against another
party. In either situation it would seem that an indemnity cross-
complaint should be permitted in the main plaintiff's action. Yet as a
practical matter there are many instances in which the lower courts,
treating the indemnity cross-complaints under the discretionary joinder
statutes, have refused to permit the joinder of indemnity cross-com-
plaints in the main action in either circumstance. This refusal, based
on the thought that a dispute between defendants has no place in a
plaintiff's action and merely confuses a jury, often makes it more diffi-
cult for the potential indemnitee successfully to pursue his claim of
indemnity, as in practice it seems to be more difficult to shift a liability
that has already been affixed by a jury through a separate indemnity
action than to place the burden on the responsible party in the main
action.
Interpretation
The problems of interpretation of insurance policy provisions rela-
tive to the indemnity field are centered about two provisions commonly
found in liability insurance policies. These are:
1. The "liability assumed by contract" exclusion, and
2. The exclusion as to any liability for which an employer has a
workman's compensation policy.
In that the field of indemnity implied as a matter of law is so new
in California, it is not surprising that there has been no interpretation
in this state of any of the aforementioned provisions relating to causes
of action in indemnity. However, several other jurisdictions have con-
sidered the effect to be given to these provisions in indemnity matters.
1. The liability assumed by contract exclusion. A typical provision
of this type provides that the policy does not cover liability incurred by
reason of any contract executed by the insured under which he under-
takes to be liable for the acts of another. A typical liability assumed by
contract exclusion may read: "This policy does not apply to liability
assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement not defined
herein."
It can be argued that this exclusion should exclude coverage both
in a situation where the insured is held liable under an express indem-
nity agreement or under an implied agreement of indemnity. However,
the general rule in most states is that a provision of this nature is opera-
tive to relieve the insurer of liability only in situations where the in-
sured would not be liable to the third party except for the fact that he
assumed liability under express agreement with such party.43 The ex-
O United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Virginia Eng'r Co., 213 F.2d 109 (4th Cir.
1954); O'Dowd v. American Sur. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 347, 144 N.E.2d 359, 157 N.Y.S.2d
182 (1957).
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clusion clause does not relieve the insurer from liability under the
policy where the liability of the insured either under an express or im-
plied contract with the third party is co-extensive with the insured's
liability imposed upon him by law regardless of the theory of indemnity
used in fastening liability as an indemnitor upon the insured. Thus the
only instance in which such an exclusion clause would in all probability
be effective is the instance in which one party for consideration has
agreed to assume the potential liability of another person though the
person assuming liability would not as a matter of law be charged with
that liability.44
2. The exclusion as to any liability for which an employer has a
workman's compensation policy. New York seems to be the only state
which has considered this particular exclusion in relation to the in-
demnity field. In Cardinal v. United States Cas. Co.,45 the New York
Court of Appeals held that there was no coverage afforded an employer
as to that liability incurred when an employee of the employer sued a
third party, and the third party secured a judgment against the em-
ployer in indemnity. The facts of this case were almost identical to
those of the Ryan case. Cardinal was a contractor who had agreed to
repair a United States government ship. One of Cardinal's employees
was injured on the ship. The employee obtained a judgment against
the United States government; the United States government cross-
complained in indemnity against Cardinal on the ground that the gov-
ernment was only passively negligent. The government received a
judgment against Cardinal for the amount of the employee's claim.
Cardinal's insurance policy contained the standard provision that
"the insurer agreed to pay all sums which the insured was obligated by
law to pay for damages" caused by accident. However, the policy con-
tained an exclusion to the effect that no insurance was afforded for
bodily injury to any employee which was covered by workman's com-
pensation.
The trial court held that the policy covered the insured against lia-
bility incurred in the third party action. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the employee's remedy against the employer in compen-
sation was exclusive, and that the policy provision did not contemplate
coverage for injury to any employee which occurred during the course
and scope of employment. Thus, the fact that the employee was able
to recover in a common law action against the third party, and that the
third party was entitled to a judgment in indemnity against the em-
ployer, did not expand the construction to be given to the insurance
44 See generally 63 A.L.R.2d 1114 (1954).
45302 N.Y. 853, 100 N.E.2d 47, 101 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1951).
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contract. The same result was reached in American Stevedores v.
American Policy Ins. Co.46 However, in the latter case the insurance
policy was held to cover the employer's liability to the third party on
the basis of a special additional insured provision of the policy.
Query as to whether California would follow these New York de-
cisions.
Res Judicata: Indemnity actions between co-defendants in the
plaintiff's main action or between a defendant in the main action and
a third party are frequently tried after the completion of the main
action. The question arises as to the extent that determinations of
negligence in the main action are res judicata in the later action for
indemnity.
Only two California cases have attacked this problem, the first being
the San Francisco Unified School District 7 case, and the second being
the recent case of County of Los Angeles v. Cox Bros. Constr. Co.4 8
These cases appear to hold that the negligence of a defendant in the
main action may be res judicata in the indemnity action in some in-
stances. Nevertheless, the fact that the negligence of one party is estab-
lished by res judicata is not determinative of the indemnity action, as
under the Alisal49 case the right to indemnity depends not upon the
mere establishing of negligence on the part of one of the parties, but
rather depends upon the various relationships between the parties
which culminated in the creation of the hazard.
Conclusion
The recent developments in indemnity law in California have in
certain instances shifted the ultimate liability from one party to an-
other where heretofore such liability would not have been shifted. This
seems to be particularly true in the area of the employer-independent
contractor relationship. Further, more and more concerns seem to be
employing the written indemnity agreements to insulate themselves
against potential liability in the construction field. It is apparent that
especially in this area, as in some others, the impact of the development
of indemnity law will be felt by insurance carriers. Consequently the
carriers will have to re-evaluate their risk potential and accordingly
their premium ratings as respects those industries in which the inci-
dence of shifting liability through indemnity is substantial.
46 138 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1955).
47 Supra, note 26.
48 195 ACA 897 (1961).
49 Supra, note 33.
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